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Abstract
Since 2008, the United States has been faced with a “jobless recovery” which
can be attributed in part to a decline in new business creation. To study the link
between small companies’ access to markets and creation of jobs, the IPO Task
Force was created. The IPO Task Force conducted research and set forth various
findings regarding the correlation between emerging growth companies and job
creation. The IPO Task Force also attributed a decline in IPO activity to the
complex regulatory environment. Accepting these findings, and in response, the
JOBS Act passed with surprisingly high bipartisan support.
The JOBS Act incorporated certain reduced regulatory barriers including, but
not limited to, the special designation of “emerging growth company” status,
reduced disclosure and accounting requirements, as well as increased access to
reports, and confidential review of draft registration statements. This Article
conducts further in-depth analysis as to these standards. In addition, this Article
presents varying opinions as to the JOBS Act, as well as research conducted as to
its effects. This Article concludes that the research presented thus far yields mixed
results, but remains optimistic that the promise of a growing economy, coupled with
the passage of time, will determine the effectiveness of the JOBS Act.
I. Introduction
On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”).1 The JOBS Act aims to “increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the public
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1. See generally Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter JOBS Act].
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capital markets for emerging growth companies.”2 To this end, Title I of the JOBS
Act, titled “Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies,”
provides for optional reduced regulation for companies with less than $1 billion in
annual gross revenues (these companies are referred to as “emerging growth
companies” in the Act) that wish to complete, or have recently completed, an initial
public offering (an “IPO”).3 In particular, the JOBS Act focuses on easing
requirements with respect to financial and compensation disclosures, auditing
standards, and the publication and distribution of research reports by brokerdealers.4 It also affords emerging growth companies the opportunity to
confidentially submit draft registration statements to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC”) before filing a registration statement publicly.5 Finally, the
legislation mandates that the SEC examine the impact of Regulation S-K and
decimalization, or the pricing of securities in one cent increments, on emerging
growth companies to determine whether these rules and policies should be modified
for these companies.6
This Article analyzes Title I of the JOBS Act from its days as little more than
a policy recommendation to its current state as enacted legislation. Part II surveys
the political and economic environment leading up to the passage of the JOBS Act.
Part III summarizes the statutory provisions of Title I relating to “emerging growth
companies.” Part IV describes responses to and research on Title I and its
underlying assumptions. Part V provides an overview of how Title I has affected the
IPO and job markets, if at all, since its inception. Part VI concludes. Although Title
I of the JOBS Act may have encouraged younger, high-growth companies to think
about going public, the mass migration to public markets and resultant job growth
that the JOBS Act promised have yet to be realized.
II. Background
A. Declining IPO Activity, Declining Employment
Since the 2008 economic crisis, start-up activity and unemployment in the
United States have been persistent problems.7 By 2011, the employment rate had
declined by an estimated 7 million jobs since 2007.8 Even more troubling, in 2011
the McKinsey Global Institute projected an additional five years of “jobless

2. Id.
3. See §§ 101-08, 126 Stat. at 307-13.
4. See §§ 102-05, 126 Stat. at 308.
5. See § 106(a), 126 Stat. at 312.
6. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 106(b), 126 Stat. 306, 312 (2012).
7. See generally James Manyika et al., An Economy That Works: Jobs Creation and America’s Future,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (June 2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/employment_and_growth
/an_economy_that_works_for_us_job_creation.
8. See id. preface.
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recovery.”9 This lack of jobs appeared to relate directly to a twenty-three percent
decline in the rate of “new business creation” since 2007.10
On January 31, 2011, President Obama announced the Startup America
“White House Initiative” in response to the sluggish economic growth and related
unemployment in the United States.11 The program was designed to “improve the
environment for high-growth entrepreneurship across the country” by implementing
policies that, among other things, opened capital markets to young, but promising,
companies.12 The goal was to encourage economic growth not only through corporate
growth and value creation, but also through increased employment opportunities.13
As part of the initiative, the Obama administration and the U.S. Treasury
Department brought capital market professionals together for a conference in
March 2011 called Access to Capital: Fostering Growth and Innovation for Small
Companies.14 During the conference, a group of these market professionals formed
the “IPO Task Force” with an aim “to 1) examine the challenges that emerging
growth companies face in pursuing an IPO and 2) develop recommendations for
helping such companies access the additional capital they need to generate jobs and
growth for the U.S. economy and to expand their businesses globally.”15 Members of
the IPO Task Force represented various sectors of the capital markets industry,
including venture capital, entrepreneurialism, securities, accounting, investment
banking, and public investments.16
On October 20, 2011, the IPO Task Force issued its report (the “IPO Report”)
to the Treasury Department.17 The IPO Report put forth several conclusions
regarding emerging growth companies, IPOs, and job growth. First, the IPO Task
Force found that “innovative, high-growth companies,” referred to throughout the
IPO Report as “emerging growth companies,” that go public create a significant
number of jobs.18 Supporting this thesis, the IPO Task Force found that “firms less
than five years old accounted for all net job growth” in the United States from 1980
to 2005, and that ninety-two percent of that job growth was created after those
companies went public.19 Second, the number of those high-growth companies going
9. Id.
10. Id. at 16.
11. See Startup America, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/business/startup-america
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
12. See Startup America/Progress Report, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/business/
startup-america/progress-report (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
13. Startup America, supra note 11 (quoting President Obama’s statement that “entrepreneurs also play a
critical role in expanding our economy and creating jobs”).
14. See Access to Capital Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/news/Pages/access-to-capital.aspx; see Fact Sheet: White House Launches
“Startup America” Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet (last visited
Sept. 21, 2014); IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB
MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 4 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/
rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf.
15. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 14.
16. See id. at 33.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 5.
19. Id.
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public had “plummeted.”20 Pointing specifically to companies backed by venture
capital investments, the IPO Report demonstrated a drop in IPOs of more than
seventy-five percent in the past two decades; 2,000 venture-backed IPOs from 1991
to 2001 compared to just 477 venture-backed IPOs from 2001-2010.21 Moreover,
those companies who went public from 2006 to 2011 waited an average of more than
nine years to do so. From 1997 to 2001, companies were completing IPOs on average
after only five and a half years.22 The IPO Task Force’s third conclusion, therefore,
was that this decline in IPO activity by high-growth companies was inevitably
contributing to a decline in jobs.23
According to the IPO Report, the decline in IPO activity could be traced back
to “a complex series of changes in the regulatory environment and related market
practices.”24 Specifically, this regulatory environment had purportedly:
1. driven up costs for emerging growth companies looking to go public, thus
reducing the supply of such companies,
2. constrained the amount of information available to investors about such
companies, thus making emerging growth company stocks more difficult to
understand and invest, and
3. shifted the economics of investment banking away from long-term investment in
such companies and toward high-frequency trading of large-cap stocks, thus
making the IPO process less attractive to, and more difficult for, emerging
growth companies.25

With these barriers in view, the IPO Task Force recommended that
lawmakers take several steps to alleviate the burden on emerging growth
companies who sought to go public.26 Specifically, the group envisioned a legislative
“on-ramp” for emerging growth companies that would apply to companies with
annual revenues of less than $1 billion and would further scale down disclosure
requirements for such companies during the “transition period” between their
existence as private companies and public issuers.27 The Task Force focused
particularly on requirements relating to the scope of financial and compensation
disclosures as well as requirements relating to internal audit control mechanisms
and accounting standards.28 In addition, the IPO Report recommended that
lawmakers “improve the availability and flow of information for investors before
and after an IPO” by removing certain restrictions on securities analyst
communications and quiet periods, introducing a system of confidential registration
statement filing, and bolstering current safe harbors relating to research reports.29

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
See id. at 17-31.
See id. at 19-25.
See id. at 21-25.
See id. at 26-29.
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With these findings and recommendations in hand, policymakers largely
accepted the IPO Task Force’s conclusion: fewer IPOs meant fewer jobs.30 And to
many in Congress, swift deregulation was the answer.31 Less than a month after the
IPO Report was presented to the Treasury Department, Congress introduced a bill
incorporating virtually all of the IPO Task Force’s suggestions.32
B. The JOBS Act in Congress: Enthusiasm Trumps Caution
On December 8, 2011, Representatives Stephen Fincher (R-TN) and John
Carney (D-Del.) introduced the JOBS Act as H.R. 3606 as co-lead sponsors in the
House of Representatives.33 The initial bill provided for the creation of an “emerging
growth company” status for companies with total annual gross revenues of less than
$1 billion.34 Such companies would benefit from reduced financial disclosure and
auditing requirements, increased communication between and among the
companies, underwriters, securities analysts, and potential investors, and an
opportunity to submit draft registration statements to the SEC for confidential
review prior to filing publicly for an IPO.35 After first being referred to the House
Committee on Financial Services, the bill was formally referred in January 2012 to
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored Enterprises.36 It
was ordered reported by the Committee on Financial Services by a vote of fifty-four
to one on February 16, 2012.37
Consideration of the bill took place in the House of Representatives on March
7, 2012.38 Much of the debate centered on whether H.R. 3606 would achieve its
stated purpose “[t]o increase American job creation and economic growth by
improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”39
Although speaking in support of the bill, Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)
described the bill as merely the “repackaging [of] a group of old bills that we’ve
passed before” and not a “comprehensive jobs bill.”40 Representative Jared Polis (DCO), while also supporting the bill, argued that more needed to be addressed, such
as the growing deficit and “uncompetitive business Tax Code,” to ensure that
employment opportunities expanded.41 Other Democrats also voiced concern over
30. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 7-8 (2012) (citing to the IPO Task Force’s report and describing the link
between small company IPOs and job growth as a major reason for the creation of the JOBS Act).
31. See id.
32. See Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011, H.R. 3606,
112th Cong. (2011) (as introduced in H.R., Dec. 8, 2011).
33. See id.; HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW § 1:3 (20122013 ed., 2012).
34. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, § 2.
35. See id. at §§ 3-7.
36. Id. at § 1:3.
37. 158 CONG. REC. H1222-04 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Sessions).
38. See id.
39. See id.; Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011, H.R. 3606,
112th Cong. (2011) (as introduced in H.R., Dec. 8, 2011).
40. 158 CONG. REC. H1222-04 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Maloney).
41. Id. (statement of Rep. Polis).
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the reduction of the regulation, stating that the JOBS Act “goes beyond what is
necessary at the expense of protecting the investor.”42 But a number of the
minority’s proposals to tighten exemptions were rejected.43 These included reducing
the annual gross revenues threshold in the definition of an emerging growth
company from $1 billion to $750 million, subjecting analyst research reports to
potential liability, and reinstating the non-binding shareholder vote on executive
compensation.44
On March 8, 2012, the House of Representatives passed the bill “on a
bipartisan basis” 390 to 23.45 The engrossed H.R. 3606 included additional
provisions that further defined the emerging growth company status, allowed
emerging growth companies to opt into certain regulatory exemptions and not
others, and required the SEC to perform its own analysis on liquidity issues and
regulatory burdens that these companies face.46 An amalgamation of six bills, H.R.
3606 included additional provisions related to capital formation but unspecific as to
emerging growth companies.47 For example, under the proposed bill, the SEC would
be directed to lift the ban on general solicitation in private offerings of securities
under Regulation D, companies would be permitted to engage in limited but
unregistered small public offerings by way of “crowdfunding” and “Regulation A+,”
and the shareholder threshold that triggers a private company’s reporting
requirement would be increased.48
Senate support for H.R. 3606 was less bipartisan.49 Just one week after the
bill passed the House of Representatives, Senators Jack Reed (D-RI), Mary
Landrieu (D-LA), and Carl Levin (D-MI) proposed an alternative bill titled the
Invigorate New Ventures and Entrepreneurs to Succeed Today in America Act of
2012, commonly referred to as the “INVEST in America Act.”50 The bill proposed to,
among other things, lower the $1 billion annual revenue threshold for emerging
growth companies to $350 million, “retain[] but modif[y] the ban on general
solicitation, and . . . retain[] more of the conflict-of-interest restrictions on research
reports that were eliminated in” H.R. 3606.51 Senator Al Franken (D-MN) argued
that the substitute bill “strikes the right balance between promoting
entrepreneurship and protecting investors” while “H.R. 3606 just has too many
problems.”52 Despite support from a number of senators, the cloture motion on
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 25-26 (2012).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33; Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth
Companies Act of 2011, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2012) (as passed by H.R., Mar. 8, 2012).
46. See H.R. 3606 §§ 101, 106-08 (as passed by H.R., Mar. 8, 2012).
47. See 158 CONG. REC. H1222-04 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Maloney); H.R. 3606 §§ 201701 (as passed by H.R., Mar. 8, 2012).
48. See H.R. 3606 §§ 201-701 (as passed by H.R., Mar. 8, 2012).
49. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33 (“Bipartisanship in the Senate surrounding the JOBS Act was
slightly overemphasized.”).
50. Id. at § 1:5; 158 CONG. REC. S1742-01 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (text of amendments).
51. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, § 1:5; 158 CONG. REC. S1742-01 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (text of
amendments).
52. 158 CONG. REC. S1995-02 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Franken).
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INVEST in America Act was defeated by four votes.53 But Democratic opposition to
H.R. 3606 remained strong. During debates, Senator Levin warned of an ominous
future:
I am going to vote no on this bill because it will significantly weaken existing
protections for investors against fraud and abuse. . . . It will . . . take the cop off the
beat relative to the activities of some huge banks, and it will threaten damage to the
honesty and integrity of our financial markets. . . . If we pass this bill, it will allow
new opportunities for fraud and abuse in capital markets. Rather than growing our
economy, we are courting the next accounting scandal, the next stock bubble, the
next financial crisis. If this bill passes, we will look back at our votes today with deep
regret.54

Others worried about the “breakneck speed” at which the bill was being
processed.55 Specifically referring to the portion of the bill focused on reducing
regulation for emerging growth companies—dubbed by many as the “IPO onramp”—Senator Reed lamented, “This so-called IPO onramp desperately needs an
offramp, through more careful consideration by the Senate and the House in
conference so that we can improve some provisions which have great merit but need
improvement.”56 The majority of senators felt differently, however, pointing to the
need for legislation, the potential benefits to small companies, and the
“overwhelming” bipartisan support that the bill enjoyed.57 With this support, the
Senate passed H.R. 3606 on March 23, 2012 by a vote of seventy-three to twentysix.58 Just four days later, the bill won the concurring vote in the House of
Representatives by a vote of 380 to 41, with nineteen abstaining.59 Signing the bill
into law on April 5, 2012, President Obama heralded the JOBS Act as “a potential
game changer” for small companies while commending legislators for their
bipartisan efforts.60 In just under four short months, Congress had brought the IPO
Task Force’s recommendations to life.
III. An Overview of Title I of the JOBS Act
As passed, the JOBS Act is comprised of seven titles, each of which
concentrates on a different aspect of capital formation, both in the private and
public markets, and a reduction of regulatory burdens.61 Title I of the Act introduces
“emerging growth companies” as a new category of securities issuers and provides
special rules for those companies should they choose to go public via an IPO.62
53. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, § 1:5.
54. 158 CONG. REC. S1963-02 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Levin).
55. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, § 1:4 (quoting Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)).
56. 158 CONG. REC. S1963-02 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Reed).
57. See id. (statement of Sen. Toomey).
58. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33.
59. Id.
60. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing.
61. See generally JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
62. See § 101-08, 126 Stat. at 307-13.
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Unlike other portions of the JOBS Act, Title I is largely self-effective; most
provisions were immediately effective on April 5, 2012 and require no further rulemaking by the SEC.63 This Section explores the provisions of Title I categorically to
explain to whom and how they apply.
A. Emerging Growth Company Status
Any company that earned annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion
“during its most recently completed fiscal year” is an emerging growth company
under the JOBS Act “as of the first day of that fiscal year,” if the company has not
completed an initial public offering on or before December 8, 2011.64 After an
emerging growth company completes its IPO, it continues to bear that status until
one of the following occurs: the last day of the fiscal year during which it earned
annual gross revenues of $1 billion or more, the last day of the fiscal year following
the fifth anniversary of the offering date of its IPO, the date on which the company
has issued more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt in the past three years, or
the date on which the company is deemed a “large accelerated filer,” whichever is
earliest.65 While the status is objectively established, the decision to take advantage
of the JOBS Act’s reduced disclosure burden is left to the company.66 With the
exception of the accounting standards requirement in Section 102(b) and Section
107 of Title I permits emerging growth companies to “‘opt-in’ to certain regulatory
requirements as they see fit.”67
B. Reduced Disclosure Requirements
Title I provides for a temporary exemption from certain disclosure
requirements for emerging growth companies.68 These disclosures concern
information about executive compensation, financial statements, and accounting
practices.69 With respect to executive compensation disclosures, Title I amends
Sections 14 and 14A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
and Section 953(b)(1) of the Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010
(the “IPSRA”)70 to include special treatment for emerging growth companies.71 A
creation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), Section 14A requires public companies to hold “a nonbinding shareholder advisory vote to approve compensation of its named executives

63. See id.
64. § 101(a)-(b), (d), 126 Stat. at 307-08.
65. Id.
66. See H.R. REP. 112-406, at 15 (2012); JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 107, 126 Stat. 306, 312-13 (2012).
67. H.R. REP. 112-406, at 15 (2012); JOBS Act, § 107(a), 126 Stat. at 312-13.
68. See JOBS Act, § 102, 126 Stat. at 308-10.
69. See id.
70. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, Title IX, §§ 901-91, 124
Stat. 1375, 1381-1955 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
71. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102(a), 126 Stat. 306, 308-09 (2012).
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at least once every three years.”72 Public companies must also hold a “say-onfrequency” vote for shareholders to determine how often say-on-pay votes will
occur.73 Section 102(a) of Title I allows emerging growth companies to avoid say-onpay and say-on-frequency votes.74 Title I further exempts emerging growth
companies from the requirement in Section 14(i) of the Exchange Act that public
companies disclose “information that shows the relationship between executive
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the” company.75
Finally, Section 953(b)(1) of the IPSRA mandates that the SEC modify its rules to
require public companies to disclose “the median of the annual total compensation
of all employees of the issuer,” excluding its chief executive officer, as well as the
total annual compensation of its CEO, and the ratio between those two amounts.76
An emerging growth company is also exempted from this requirement under Section
102(a)(3) of the JOBS Act.77 If an emerging growth company loses its status as such
prior to the second anniversary of its IPO offering date, it has until the third
anniversary of that offering date to comply with these executive compensation
voting and disclosure requirements.78 If the company loses its status after the
second anniversary of its IPO offering date, it has one year from the date it loses
that status to comply with the requirements.79
Title I grants leniency with respect to financial disclosures and accounting
practices, as well.80 To this end, Section 102(b) of the JOBS Act amends Section 7(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and Section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act, which provide minimum disclosure requirements in an issuer’s IPO
registration statement and subsequent public filings, respectively.81 The
amendments are twofold, addressing both disclosure requirements and compliance
with accounting standards.82 With respect to disclosure requirements, emerging
growth companies are exempted from Item 301 in Regulation S-X,83 which requires
public companies that have a public float of $75 million or more (or, in the case of a
company contemplating an IPO, an estimated post-offering public float of $75
million or more) to disclose detailed financial data for “each of the last five fiscal
years of the registrant” or for the life of the registrant, whichever is shorter.84
These companies must also disclose such information for “[a]ny additional fiscal
years necessary to keep the information from being misleading.”85 Under the JOBS
72. Kiersten Zaza, Developments in Banking Law, The Impact of Say-on-Pay, 31 REV. BANKING FIN. L. 580,
580 (2012); 15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a) (2014).
73. Zaza, supra note 72; 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b) (2014).
74. § 102(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 308-09.
75. Id. at § 102(a)(2), 126 Stat. at 309; 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e)(2).
76. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, §§ 953(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1375, 1904 (2010).
77. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102(a)(3), 126 Stat. 306, 309 (2012).
78. Id. § 102(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 308-09.
79. Id.
80. See id. at § 102(b), 126 Stat. at 309-10.
81. Id.
82. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102(b), 126 Stat. 306, 309-10 (2012).
83. Id. at § 102(b)(1)-(2), (c), 126 Stat. at 309-10.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(a), (c) (2009).
85. Id. at § 229.301(b).
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Act, however, emerging growth companies “need not present more than [two] years
of audited financial statements in order for” their IPO registration statements to be
effective.86 Moreover, audited financial statements for any year prior to those
required in the IPO registration statement are not required in any subsequent
public filing so long as the company remains an emerging growth company.87
C. Accounting Standards and Disclosure
In addition to easing financial reporting obligations, Section 102(b) provides
that emerging growth companies need not comply with “any new or revised
financial accounting standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board” (the “FASB”) until private companies are also subject to it, if the standard
applies to private companies.88 The FASB allows private companies “delayed
effective dates” premised on the idea that these companies require more time and
effort than would a public company to comply with new or revised standards. 89
Allowing emerging growth companies the same benefit even after they complete an
IPO eases the potential burden of becoming a public company.
The JOBS Act further eases accounting requirements by exempting emerging
growth companies from any rules of the FASB “requiring mandatory audit firm
rotation or a supplement to the auditor’s report in which the auditor would be
required to provide additional information about the audit and the financial
statements” of the company.90 This latter requirement refers to an “auditor
discussion and analysis” resembling the “management discussion and analysis” that
is ubiquitous on registration forms and other periodic reporting documents.91 Since
the JOBS Act became effective, any new rule that the FASB adopts with respect to
the audit of public companies will apply to emerging growth companies only if the
SEC “determines that the application of [the rule] is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest.”92
Finally, JOBS Act Section 103 exempts emerging growth companies from
Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).93 Under
Section 404(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, public companies must disclose for each fiscal
86. JOBS Act, § 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. at 309.
87. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102(b)(2), 126 Stat. 306, 309-10 (2012).
88. H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 14 (2012); JOBS Act, § 102(b), 126 Stat. at 309-10 (referring to private
companies as companies that are not “issuers” as defined by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2(a)(7), 116 Stat. 745, 747 (2002) (defining “issuer” as a company subject to the reporting
requirements of § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or a company that has filed and not withdrawn a
registration statement with the SEC).
89. Lynn Rees, JOBS Act Carries Implications for FASB/PCAOB Independence , FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS RES.
INITIATIVE (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.fasri.net/index.php/2012/03/jobs-act-carries-implications-for-fasbpcaobindependence/.
90. JOBS Act, § 104, 126 Stat. at 310.
91. Id.; see also Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (providing an overview of and guidance
regarding management discussion and analysis in financial disclosures).
92. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 104, 126 Stat. 306, 310 (2012).
93. See id. at § 103, 126 Stat. at 310; Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b).
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year “an internal control report” which describes management’s role in “establishing
and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting” and an assessment by the management of those structures and
procedures.94 Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley, in conjunction with Section 989G of
the Dodd-Frank Act, requires the auditor of any company with a public float of $75
million or more to perform an audit of management’s assessment.95 The JOBS Act
excuses emerging growth companies from this requirement for as long as they
retain their status.96
D. Research Reports and Information on Emerging Growth Companies
Perhaps to counter the reduced disclosure that emerging growth companies
must provide, Title I increases the availability of securities analyst reports and
communications by and among broker-dealers, underwriters, the company itself,
and potential investors.97 This increased availability allows emerging growth
companies to “test the waters” before executing an IPO.98 The JOBS Act amends
Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act, which provides the definition of an “offer” to
purchase or sell a security, to exclude from this definition research reports
published or distributed by a broker-dealer “about an emerging growth company
that is the subject of a proposed public offering . . . pursuant to a registration
statement that the issuer proposes to file, or has filed, or that is effective . . . .”99
This exclusion applies regardless of whether the broker-dealer participated, is
participating, or proposes to participate in the offering.100 Moreover, the JOBS Act
defines the term “research report” broadly, including “written, electronic, or oral
communication that includes information, opinions, or recommendations with
respect to securities of an issuer or an analysis of a security or an issuer, whether or
not it provides information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment
decision.”101
Normally, these types of “reports,” save for oral communications, could
constitute offers of an issuer’s security.102 Such offers are otherwise prohibited prior
to the filing of a registration statement and highly regulated thereafter, in some
cases even after the registration statement becomes effective.103 But the JOBS Act
94. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a).
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)-(c); Dodd-Frank Act § 989G.
96. See JOBS Act, § 103, 126 Stat. at 310.
97. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105, 126 Stat. 306, 310-11 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 14-15
(2012).
98. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, § 1:22.
99.
JOBS Act, § 105(a), 126 Stat. at 310-11.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 189 (6th ed. 2009) (covering existing safe harbors that exempt research reports from Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933).
103. Id. at 168-79 (describing the regulation of offers during the period after the registration statement has
been filed but before it becomes effective (the “waiting period”) and offers after the registration statement has
become effective (the “post-effective period”)).
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opens up previously-closed lines of communications to allow information about an
emerging growth company’s offering to flow to investors even before the company
has made public disclosures in its registration statement.104 Section 105(c) of the
JOBS Act amends Section 5 of the Securities Act to allow an emerging growth
company or “any person authorized to act on behalf” of the company itself, to make
offers to “potential investors that are qualified institutional buyers or institutions
that are accredited investors” prior to filing a registration statement in order to
assess investor interest.105 Section 105(d) of the JOBS Act goes further to expand
the availability of research reports and other communications regarding an
emerging growth company’s securities after the offering. The Act prohibits the
“adopt[ion] or maint[enance of] any rule or regulation prohibiting any broker,
dealer, or member of a national securities association from publishing or
distributing” such reports or communications following an emerging growth
company’s IPO or during any securities holding period agreed to between the
company and those entities.106
In addition to research reports and communications between the issuer or
underwriters and investors, the JOBS Act removes restrictions with respect to
broker-dealer internal communications.107 Section 105(b) of the Act prohibits the
SEC and any registered national securities association from “adopt[ing] or
maintain[ing] any rule or regulation in connection with” the IPO of an emerging
growth company that restricts which member of a broker-dealer or national
securities association “may arrange for communications between a securities
analyst and a potential investor” or whether a securities analyst can participate in
communications between non-securities analysts and the emerging growth
company’s management.108 Removing these restrictions breaks down the traditional
“Chinese Wall” between securities analysts and other members of a broker-dealer
that has existed primarily as “a prophylactic against illegal activity and as a legal
defense against insider trading and potential conflicts of interest
in securities firms.”109
E. Confidential Review of Draft Registration Statements
For emerging growth companies who wish to go public, the JOBS Act
introduces a system of confidential review by SEC staff of draft registration
statements.110 Section 106(a) amends Section 6 of the Securities Act so that
emerging growth companies “may confidentially submit to the [SEC] a draft
registration statement, for confidential nonpublic review by the staff” prior to
104. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105, 126 Stat. 306, 310-11 (2012).
105. § 105(c), 126 Stat. at 311.
106. § 105(d), 126 Stat. at 311.
107. § 105(b), 126 Stat. at 311.
108. Id.
109. See H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 369, 369-70 (2008).
110. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 106(a), 126 Stat. 306, 312 (2012).
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publicly filing a registration statement for its IPO.111 A company who takes
advantage of this opportunity must publicly file its registration statement at least
twenty-one days prior to conducting a road show, or presentation to potential
investors regarding the offering.112 However, the SEC cannot be “compelled to
disclose any information provided to or obtained by” it through a confidential review
under Section 106(a).113
F. Decimalization, Tick Size, and Regulation S-K for Emerging Growth Companies
Title I of the JOBS Act tasked the SEC with two assignments concerning (i)
decimalization, or the “trading and quoting [of] securities in one penny increments,”
(ii) tick size, or the increment by which a company’s security is traded, and (iii)
Regulation S-K, which governs line item disclosures in the registration
statement.114 The SEC was required to submit two reports to Congress within
ninety days and 180 days respectively of the enactment of the JOBS Act.115 The first
report, as directed by Section 106(b), was to analyze the impact that the transition
from fractional pricing and quoting to decimalization has had on the IPO market
and on liquidity for “small and middle capitalization company securities” (often
referred to as “small cap” and “mid cap” company securities).116 The SEC was to
conclude in this report as to whether liquidity would be enhanced with respect to
these securities if the one penny increment tick size was increased. 117 If the SEC
found that an increase in tick size was beneficial, Section 106(b) allows the SEC to
create the regulation necessary to increase the tick size up to $0.10.118 The second
report required an analysis of disclosure requirements under Regulation S-K “to
determine how such requirements can be updated to modernize and simplify the
registration process and reduce the costs and other burdens associated with these
requirements for issuers who are emerging growth companies.”119 In this report the
SEC was to present “specific recommendations” to make disclosure requirements
“more efficient and less burdensome” for both emerging growth companies and the
SEC.120
IV. Responses, Research, and Predictions
Title I of the JOBS Act garnered much attention both before and after its
enactment. Questions arose in the private and public sectors as to whether the law
would achieve its objectives and at what expense it would achieve such objectives.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2009).
JOBS Act, § 106(a), 126 Stat. at 312.
See §§ 106(b), 108, 126 Stat. at 312, 313; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10 et seq. (2009).
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 106(b), 108, 126 Stat. 306, 312 (2012).
§ 106(b), 126 Stat. at 312.

Id.
Id.

JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 108(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012).

Id.
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In academic circles, some speculated that the JOBS Act’s reduced regulations were
an attempt to fix a problem that did not exist. The existing regulatory environment,
they argued, was not preventing companies from going public. And significant
research published after the JOBS Act enactment shed additional light on the
relationship between IPOs and job growth.
A. Mixed Reactions at the SEC
While many heralded the JOBS Act as an effective response to the decline in
the number of IPOs completed by small companies in the United States over the
past decade and its impact on employment, some at the SEC feel that the JOBS Act
left investors too vulnerable.121 One outspoken opponent of the Act was thenChairman Mary Shapiro.122 In a letter to Congress, Chairman Shapiro cautioned
that the JOBS Act bill lacked sufficient “investor protections.”123 According to the
Chairman, the $1 billion threshold for determining emerging growth company
status posed too much risk on investors by applying to an overly-broad group of
companies.124 The law’s provisions regarding underwriter research reports and
communications between securities research analysts and underwriters caused the
Chairman similar alarm.125 Such relaxed regulations, she argued, could negatively
affect investor confidence and leave investors without “the full protections of the
securities laws.”126 And while the Chairman agreed that reducing certain disclosure
requirements for smaller companies “could be a reasonable approach,” she felt that
the Act’s impact on accounting disclosures and compliance “undermine[d]
independent standard-setting” by the FASB and the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board.127 She further believed that the exemption pertaining to audits of
internal controls was “unwarranted” seeing that this otherwise-applicable
requirement “has significantly improved the quality and reliability of financial
reporting and provides important investor protections.”128

121. Compare Pablo Chavez, Bipartisanship, New Businesses and New Jobs, with a Little Help from Your
Friends, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012, 11:26 AM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2012/03/
bipartisanship-new-businesses-and-new.html, and Emily Mendell, NVCA Celebrates JOBS Act Bill Signing,
NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ACCESS (Apr. 11, 2012), http://nvcaccess.nvca.org/index.php/topics/events/292-nvcacelebrates-jobs-act-bill-signing.html, with Letter from Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to
Tim Johnson, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Richard C. Shelby, Ranking
Member, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13, 2012), available
at http://www.aicpa.org/advocacy/issues/downloadabledocuments/404b/3-13-12_sec_chm_schapiro_letter_to_john
son.pdf [hereinafter Shapiro Letter], and Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Public
Statement by Commissioner: Investor Protection is Needed for True Capital Formation Views on the JOBS Act
(Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch031612laa.htm [hereinafter Aguilar
Statement].
122. See Shapiro Letter, supra note 121.
123. Id. at 1.
124. Id. at 2.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Chairman Shapiro’s sentiments were not unique. Just three days after the
Chairman addressed her letter to Congress, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar
made a public statement condemning H.R. 3606 as a bill that “seems to impose
tremendous costs and potential harm on investors with little to no corresponding
benefit.”129 Much of his criticism mirrored that of the Chairman:
H.R. 3606 . . . would seriously hurt investors by reducing transparency and investor
protection and, in turn, make securities law enforcement more difficult. . . . [T]here is
significant research to support the conclusion that disclosure requirements and other
capital markets regulations enhance, rather than impede, capital formation, and that
regulatory compliance costs are not a principal cause of the decline in IPO activity
over the past decade. Moreover, nothing in the bill requires or even incentivizes
issuers to use any capital that may be raised to expand their businesses or create
jobs in the U.S.130

The Commissioner explained that the definition of emerging growth company
captured an estimated ninety-eight percent of IPOs and “a large majority of U.S.
public companies.”131 He argued that the temporary exemption from compliance
with new or revised accounting standards “may result in inconsistent accounting
rules that could damage financial transparency” and distort investors’ ability to
properly evaluate investments.132 The Commissioner also lamented the exemption
from the independent audit of financial controls requirement.133 Arguing that the
requirement is “an important mechanism for enhancing the reliability of financial
statements,” he explained that larger public companies who performed these audits
had “a 5.1% decline in financial statement restatements from 2009 to 2010” while
smaller public companies who did not perform such audits “experienced a 13.8%
increase in such restatements.”134 Like Chairman Shapiro, Commissioner Aguilar
also criticized H.R. 3606’s relaxation of rules concerning communications between
securities research analysts and underwriters.135 Removing these restrictions, he
argued, would cause investors to lose trust in the IPO market.136
B. Attacking a Problem That Does Not Exist?
Since the enactment of the JOBS Act, several academics have put forth their
own reasoning to explain the dearth of small company IPOs.137 In August 2012, as
part of the Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, Professors Xiaohui Gao,

129. Aguilar Statement, supra note 121.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Xiahui Gao, Jay R. Ritter, & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? (Aug. 26,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1954788.
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Jay R. Ritter, and Zhongyan Zhu presented their own hypothesis to the SEC.138
Over-regulation was not the issue, they argued.139 Instead, the decrease in IPO
activity by smaller companies was attributable to “increased economies of scope”
and the “increased importance of speed to market.”140 The authors fleshed out their
reasoning, dubbed the “economies of scope hypothesis,” in a related working paper
later that year.141 They found that small firm profitability has been steadily
declining since 1995.142 One reason for this decline in profitability was the fact that
smaller companies “lack the resources to quickly take advantage of new
technology.”143 As a result, larger companies were reaching profitable markets more
quickly, leaving smaller companies’ revenues to suffer.144 To attain profitability,
these smaller companies are bypassing public market financing and instead
merging with bigger companies that can provide synergies and economies of
scale.145 If this is the case, no amount of regulation or deregulation can affect these
small companies’ business decisions to complete a merger rather than IPO.
The economies of scope hypothesis, though not specifically referred to as
such, appeared in testimony to Congress as early as 2011.146 In his testimony before
the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Professor John C. Coates IV of
Harvard Law School questioned the assumption that deregulation was the answer
to the IPO problem.147 “More serious impediments to a renewal of IPOs,” he stated,
“is the increased ‘deretailization’ of the equity markets.”148 As more and more
investors are institutional investors, liquidity—and, in turn, larger cap company
stock—become more attractive than illiquid, small cap company stock.149
In this sense, it is not the overly-burdensome regulation that is discouraging
smaller companies from going public, but the change in investor base that is
making it increasingly difficult for smaller public companies to thrive.150

138. See XIAHUI GAO, JAY R. RITTER, & ZHONGYAN ZHU, WHERE HAVE ALL THE IPOS GONE? (2012) (presented
to the SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-090712-ritter-slides.pdf.
139. See id. at 6-8.
140. Id. at 8-9.
141. See Gao, Ritter & Zhu, supra note 137, at 2.
142. Id. at 7-11.
143. Id. at 11.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 3 (“We contend that many small firms can create greater operating profits by selling out in a
trade sale (being acquired by a firm in the same or a related industry) rather than operating as an independent
firm and relying on organic (i.e., internal) growth.”).
146. See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate, 112th Cong. 21-22 (Dec. 14, 2011) (testimony of
John C. Coates, IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School), available at
www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=1d24b42e-3ef8-4653-bfe8-9c47
6740fafa.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 21.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 21-22.
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C. Research on Post-IPO Employment
Some critics of the JOBS Act doubted the proposition that Congress appeared
to whole-heartedly and quickly accept—that IPOs equal job growth.151 Professor Jay
R. Ritter of the University of Florida commented, “Conventional wisdom is that
companies going public create a lot of jobs. . . . The numbers that the venture
capital lobby keep repeating are grossly overstated in terms of what the average
IPO can accomplish.”152 And almost a year after the passage of the JOBS Act, one
critic maintains that “the JOBS Act has little to do with employment.”153 “The
largest number of jobs likely to be created by the JOBS Act,” quipped Steven
Rattner, “will be for lawyers needed to clean up the mess that it will create.”154 But
post-JOBS Act research on job growth in public companies at least partially
supports the contention that IPOs create jobs.155
Just one month after President Obama signed the JOBS Act into law, the
Kauffman Foundation published a report, co-authored by Professor Ritter, entitled
“Post-IPO Employment and Revenue Growth for U.S. IPOs, June 1996-2010” (the
“Kauffman Report”).156 The Kauffman Report surveys 1,700 “emerging growth
companies”—defined differently from the JOBS Act—as “domestic companies less
than thirty years old that are not spinoffs, rollups, buyouts, or demutualizations.”157
While the JOBS Act definition captures approximately ninety-three percent of all
IPOs, the authors’ definition captures only sixty-one percent.158 The Kauffman
Report’s “emerging growth companies” also included companies like Google and
Facebook, which do not fit the JOBS Act’s criteria, “but exclude[d] buyout-backed
IPOs,” which do fit within the JOBS Act’s criteria.159 The survey of these “emerging
growth companies” showed that “aggregate employment . . . increased from 651,000
employees prior to the IPO to 1.666 million employees in 2010, a 156 percent
increase.”160 However, the overall increase could be attributed largely to certain
“standout performers” such as Amazon, Google, and eBay—all of which went public
with annual revenues below $1 billion (not adjusted for inflation).161

151. See, e.g., John Tozzi, IPOs’ Job-Boosting Power Is Overblown, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 21,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-21/ipos-boon-for-jobs-is-overblown.
152. Id.
153. Steven Rattner, A Sneaky Way to Deregulate, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Mar. 3, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/a-sneaky-way-to-deregulate/.
154. Id.
155. See generally MARTIN KENNEY, DONALD PATTON, & JAY. R. RITTER, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, POST-IPO
EMPLOYMENT REVENUE GROWTH FOR U.S. IPOS, JUNE 1996-2010 (2012) [hereinafter KAUFFMAN REPORT].
156. See id.
157. Id. at 1.
158. Id. at 1, n.2.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1.
161. See id. Amazon went public in 1997 with annual revenues in 1996 of $8.5 million. Amazon.com, Inc.,
Registration Statement (Form S-1) 20 (Mar. 24, 1997). eBay went public in 1998 with annual revenues in 1997
of $5.7 million. eBay Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 77 (July 15, 1998). Google went public in 2004
with annual revenues in 2003 of $961,874,000. Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 35 (Apr. 29,
2004).
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The Kauffman Report’s conclusions paralleled those put forth earlier by the
President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness.162 In a 2011 report that was also
cited by Congress in support of the JOBS Act, the Council found that younger
companies were “adding fewer jobs on average than they were in previous
decades.”163 Had start-up activity remained consistent since 2007, the report went
on, there would have existed close to two million additional jobs in 2011.164
According to this research, the premise on which the JOBS Act was based appears
to hold true.
V. Title I in Effect: More IPO Talk, Less IPO Action
Since its enactment, Title I of the JOBS Act has been both popular and
disappointing. While certain eligible companies appear eager to take advantage of
reduced regulation, to many emerging growth companies, the stigma attached to
getting “special treatment” by regulators undermines the advantages of going
public. Confidential filing, therefore, has emerged as a favorite opportunity for
companies who are looking to decide whether going public is in fact the route they
wish to go. The continued stagnation in the U.S. IPO market suggests that
confidential filing is helping companies confirm that they should remain private
rather than entice them to go public. Moreover, recommendations regarding
Regulation S-K and decimalization, as required by Title I, imply that more
deregulation is needed to attract young, high-growth companies to the public capital
markets.
A. IPOs Still Down, but Emerging Growth Companies Appear Promising
IPOs in 2012 raised a total of $42.6 billion, representing a seventeen percent
increase over IPO proceeds in 2011.165 Excluding the $16 billion raised in
Facebook’s IPO, however, overall proceeds actually decreased by twenty-seven
percent.166 This decrease seems to imply that Title I of the JOBS Act has failed to
jumpstart IPO activity. But that may not be true. A simultaneous decrease in
median deal size in 2012 suggests that the JOBS Act has encouraged smaller
companies to go public.167 In fact, median deal size in 2012 decreased by twentythree percent from $160.2 million in 2011 to $124 million in 2012, indicating that
more small companies are opting to go public.168 And research indicates that “nearly
75% of issuers that priced a U.S. IPO after [the enactment of the JOBS Act]
162. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS, TAKING ACTION, BUILDING CONFIDENCE: FIVE
COMMON-SENSE INITIATIVES TO BOOST JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS 17-18 (2011), available at http://files.jobscouncil.com/jobscouncil/files/2011/10/JobsCouncil_InterimReport_Oct11.pdf.
163. Id. at 17; H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 7 (2012).
164. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 162.
165. RENAISSANCE CAPITAL, US IPO MARKET 2012 ANNUAL REVIEW 2 (2013), available at
http://www.renaissancecapital.com/ipohome/review/2012USReview.pdf.
166. Id. at 1-2.
167. Id. at 2.
168. See id.
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identified themselves as” emerging growth companies in their registration
statements.169 Of those emerging growth companies who priced IPOs,
approximately eighty-five percent had annual revenues of less than $250 million—
well below the $1 billion threshold that captures emerging growth companies.170
Still, whether this data proves that the JOBS Act is catalyzing IPOs among young,
high-growth companies is uncertain. Capital markets research firm Renaissance
Capital postulates that the JOBS Act “has had no noticeable effects other than
reducing the minimum time from filing to pricing,” presumably due to the
availability of confidential filing.171
According to Bloomberg, 328 companies listed on national securities
exchanges in the United States as of the JOBS Act’s enactment qualified as
emerging growth companies in that they had less than $1 billion in annual revenue,
had gone public within the last five years, had issued no more than $1 billion in
debt, and had a public float of less than $700 billion.172 This number ostensibly
included companies that had gone public before December 8, 2011 and thus would
not qualify for the JOBS Act’s reduced regulation.173 It also excluded public
companies trading over-the-counter and, of course, private companies that fit the
emerging growth company definition.174 The 328 listed companies did include “hot
tech companies” like Yelp, Pandora, LinkedIn, Zipcar, and Orbitz Worldwide, as
well as twenty companies based in China.175 Approximately half of these 328
companies were trading above their IPO prices as of April 3, 2012, perhaps
demonstrating the higher investment risk associated with emerging growth
companies.176 That also meant, however, that half of those companies were trading
below their IPO prices.177
Despite the performance of the companies cited by Bloomberg, companies
who took advantage of the emerging growth company status to go public in 2012
generally fared better than their larger counterparts. 178 According to data from
financial-advisory firm Ernst & Young, “nearly three quarters of the [eighty-seven]
companies that filed a public registration statement through the end of 2012
169. LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, THE JOBS ACT AFTER ONE YEAR: A REVIEW OF THE NEW IPO PLAYBOOK 2
(2013).
170. Id. at 4.
171. See RENAISSANCE CAPITAL, supra note 165, at 10.
172. John Tozzi, The JOBS Act Loosens Regs for Companies Like These , BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 5,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-05/the-jobs-act-loosens-regs-for-companies-like-these.
Although not addressed in depth in this Article, it is interesting to note that Title I appears to have encouraged
the creation of public special purpose acquisition vehicles (“SPACs”), otherwise known as shell companies. See
generally Usha Rodrigues, SPACs and the JOBS Act, 3 HARV. BUS. L.R. ONLINE 1, 17 (2012),
http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SPACs-and-the-JOBS-Act-Rodrigues.pdf.
173. See Tozzi, supra note 172; JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101(d), 126 Stat. 306, 308 (2012).
174. Tozzi, supra note 172.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Brian Matt, Private Firms Pushed to Tell Better Investment Stories , CFO.COM (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www3.cfo.com/article/2013/1/capital-markets_jobs-act-emerging-growth-companies-investment-storytestin
g-the-waters-sec; Olivia Oran, IPO View-Update 1-US Jobs Act cos outperform other IPOs –data, REUTERS (Jan.
25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/jobs-act-ipos-idUSL1N0AUC6V20130125.

Vol. 3, Fall 2014

81

Global Markets Law Journal
self-identified as ‘emerging growth companies.’”179 Of companies that completed
exchange-traded IPOs in 2012, approximately two-thirds completed their offering as
an emerging growth company.180 Additionally, “price performance of [emerging
growth company] offerings during 2012 was superior to [that of non-emerging
growth companies] in both the short term (one day and one week subsequent to
pricing) and the longer term (through the end of 2012).”181 While non-emerging
growth companies’ stock rose, on average, 13.1 percent above their IPO price,
emerging growth companies’ stock rose an average of 28.9 percent.182 Although the
Russell 2000 Growth Index, “a barometer of small cap growth stocks,” rose eleven
percent since the enactment of the JOBS Act, emerging growth companies still
generally outperformed it.183 The investor bases of emerging growth companies
mirrored that of larger companies, as well.184 It might thus be inferred that
investors did not perceive emerging growth companies as presenting significant
investment risk.185 But critics counter that U.S. markets have been independently
on the upswing since the JOBS Act was enacted. Investors might therefore be
willing to take on more risk.186
B. Saying “No Thanks” to Special Treatment
Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that most companies that could qualify as
emerging growth companies are choosing not to take advantage of the JOBS Act’s
reduced disclosure requirements.187 Dealogic and the Wall Street Journal found
that eighty-five percent of emerging growth companies that went public between
April and November 2012 chose not to take advantage of the JOBS Act provision
that would allow them to delay compliance with new or modified accounting
practices.188 One reason for this decision is that younger companies are willing to
comply with otherwise burdensome requirements to avoid the “stigma” attached to
exemptions.189 Trulia Inc., a real estate website that went public as an emerging
growth company in September 2012, opted to take advantage of only the
confidential filing provision of the JOBS Act.190 The company’s general counsel,
Scott Darling, explained, “We really wanted to project to investors that we are a
179. Chris Dieterich, After JOBS Act, Confidential Filers Rise, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324162304578307052032008888.html?KEYWORDS=confidenti
al+filers.
180. Matt, supra note 178.
181. Id.
182. Oran, supra note 178.
183. Id.
184. Matt, supra note 178.
185. See id.
186. Oran, supra note 178.
187. Id.
188. Jessica Holzer, Some Firms Shun Looser IPO Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578117322881014396.html?mg=idwsj#articleTabs%3
Darticle.
189. See id.
190. Id.
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mature company.”191 Eloqua Inc., a software company that went public a month
before Trulia, followed the same reasoning. By choosing not to make full disclosures
“[w]e might look like a little-boy company when we worked really hard to be a bigboy company,” quipped Eloqua’s Chief Executive Officer Joseph Payne.192 Many
industry experts agree, believing that companies who use the opportunity to present
less financial and accounting disclosure risk face increased scrutiny from
investors.193 Such increased scrutiny can lead to lower valuations and a higher cost
of capital for emerging growth companies.194 Xoom Corp., which went public in
February 2013, looked to bypass this risk by making full disclosures. 195 “The whole
point is what you are signaling,” remarked Roelof Botha, a partner in the privateequity firm Sequoia Capital LLC and board member of Xoom. 196 “If you have five
years or so of financial history and you aren’t showing them all, the question
becomes, why aren’t you?”197
C. Taking Full Advantage of Confidential Filings
One very popular aspect of Title I has been the opportunity to receive
confidential reviews of draft registration statements under Section 106(b).198 Ernst
& Young hypothesized that the dramatic decrease in the number of companies filing
IPO registration statements in the second quarter of 2012 compared to the number
of filers in the second quarter of 2011 was due, among other things, to “confidential
filings under the JOBS Act.”199 Supporting this contention is the fact that
approximately fifty-nine percent of emerging growth companies confidentially filed
draft registration documents to the SEC through the end of 2012.200 In fact, the
SEC received two confidential filings from emerging growth companies just hours
after the JOBS Act was signed into law.201 By February 2013, approximately 150
emerging growth companies had filed confidentially.202 In preparation for the
expected onslaught of confidential filings, the SEC had to create a new filing system
apart from its electronic public filing system EDGAR.203 Until the SEC implements
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. (quoting Andrew Shapiro, president of the hedge-fund firm Lawndale Capital Management
LLC)
195. Dieterich, supra note 179.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. U.S. IPO Pipeline Slows Due to Confidential Filings Under JOBS Act and Investor Uncertainty , ERNST
& YOUNG (June 27, 2012), http://www.ey.com/US/en/Newsroom/News-releases/News_U-S-IPO-Pipeline-SlowsDue-to-Confidential-Filings (depicting a drop from forty-four registrants in Q2 2011 down to just twenty-four in
Q2 2012).
200. Dieterich, supra note 179.
201. Transcript of Fourth Meeting of Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 6 (June 8, 2012) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Transcript] (statement of Jennifer Zepralka).
202. Jessica Holzer, SEC Official: Confidential Filings Popular After JOBS Act, WALL. ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/02/22/sec-official-confidential-filings-popular-after-jobs-act/.
203. See Advisory Committee Transcript, supra note 201.
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an electronic system for confidential filings, emerging growth companies can submit
draft registration statements to the SEC by regular mail either in paper or in a
searchable PDF file on a CD or DVD.204
Emerging growth companies who take advantage of this opportunity to file
confidentially “can keep [their] financial and strategic plans away from the prying
eyes of competitors” and avoid “tip[ping] their hand at intentions to go public.”205
Like companies that present limited financial information, companies that file for
an IPO but fail to complete the offering face negative reactions from the markets. 206
Confidential filing allows emerging growth companies to file for their IPO but wait
for the right market window to complete the offering without fear of creating
negative perception.207
Not all emerging growth companies have found the ability to file
confidentially a worthwhile advantage.208 For example, Blackstratus, a computer
security emerging growth company, decided not to file its registration statement
confidentially.209 The tradeoff an emerging company faces if it chooses to file
confidentially is that it must disclose its filing history, including confidentially-filed
registration statements and conversations with the SEC, at least twenty-one days
prior to beginning its road show.210 This means that a company who chooses to file
confidentially may not be able to take advantage of market windows that present
themselves in a short time frame.211 Additionally, some companies may view the
confidential filing process as a means of demonstrating that they are not mature
companies.212 These companies are worried that perhaps a confidential filing might
color the SEC’s and investors’ analysis of the companies’ disclosures.213
One former SEC official commented that the twenty-one day gap between when a
company has to disclose its otherwise confidential filings can be an invitation for
extra attention.214 An emerging growth company must thus decide whether the
opportunity for a confidential SEC review of disclosures is worth the added
inspections.
D. Weighing in on Tick Size and Regulation S-K
Sections 106(b) and 108 of the JOBS Act call upon the SEC to make two
reports to Congress on the impact of decimalization and Regulation S-K on
204.

the

Division Announcement Regarding Confidential Submission of Draft Registration Statements under
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 5, 2012),

www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfannouncements/draftregstatements.htm.
205. Dieterich, supra note 179.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. Emily Chasan, Confidential Filing Not A No-Brainer For Aspiring IPOs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/04/19/confidential-filing-not-a-no-brainer-for-aspiring-ipos/.
209. Id.
210. See id.; JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 106(a), 126 Stat. 306, 312 (2012).
211. Chasan, supra note 208.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Id.
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emerging growth companies.215 The report on decimalization (the “Decimalization
Report”) was presented to Congress in July 2012.216 In December 2013, the SEC
presented its report on Regulation S-K (the “Regulation S-K Report”).217
In its IPO Report, the IPO Task Force pointed to the introduction of
decimalization as part of a “regulatory cascade” that effectively shifted the market’s
focus towards large cap stocks at the expense of small cap stocks.218 Despite the
Task Force’s assertions, the SEC’s Report was largely inconclusive.219 The SEC staff
cited to the lack of literature regarding long-term effects of decimalization on small
and middle capitalization companies and the many variables—some being, perhaps,
of much greater significance to the number of U.S. IPOs—that should be focused on
additionally, if not alternatively, to tick size:220
The Commission should not proceed with the specific rulemaking to increase tick
sizes, as provided for in Section 106(b) of the JOBS Act, but should consider
additional steps that may be needed to determine whether rulemaking should be
undertaken in the future. The Staff believes that the Commission should solicit the
views of investors, companies, market professionals, academics, and other interested
parties on the broad topic of decimalization, how to best study its effects on IPOs,
trading, and liquidity for small and middle capitalization companies, and what, if
any, changes should be considered.221

To this end, the SEC held a Decimalization Roundtable on February 5, 2013 during
which “three panels discussed various impacts of decimalization and tick sizes on
the securities markets.”222 The discussions focused heavily on the problems facing
small cap stocks, although some observers were “surprised” by the glaring lack of a
chief financial officer or investor relations representative from a public company on
any of the panels,” particularly when “it was the fate of their stocks that was being
discussed.”223
The Decimalization Report did indicate, however, that an increased tick size
would benefit emerging growth companies.224 Without concluding on the cause, the
SEC stated that “lower spreads” (i.e., the difference between the bid price and the
ask price) “tend to be associated with equity securities that are considered to be
more, rather than less, liquid.”225 Since the securities of an emerging growth
company tend to be on average less liquid, if their spreads were higher, then the
215.
216.

JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 106(b), 126 Stat. 306, 312-13 (2012).
See generally STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
DECIMALIZATION (2012) [hereinafter DECIMALIZATION REPORT].
217. See generally STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON REVIEW OF
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K (2013) [hereinafter REGULATION S-K REPORT].
218. See IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 9, 13.
219. See DECIMALIZATION REPORT, supra note 216, at 21-23.
220. See id. at 19-23.
221. Id. at 22.
222. See Decimalization, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/decimalization.shtml (last
visited Sept. 21, 2014).
223. Our Take on the SEC Decimalization Roundtable, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://blog.themistrading.com/our-take-on-the-sec-decimalization-roundtable/.
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company could potentially benefit from an increased tick size. 226 Commenting on
the Decimalization Report, Associate Professor at Georgetown University’s
McDonough School of Business James J. Angel suggested that the SEC “should
experiment with letting issuers specify their own tick sizes.”227 Emerging growth
companies that are “smaller and less liquid,” he reasoned, “may benefit from
providing relatively more protection [such as an increased tick size] for liquidity
providers.”228
In the Regulation S-K Report, the SEC’s overall conclusion was that “further
information gathering and review is warranted in order to formulate specific
recommendations regarding specific disclosure requirements.” 229 Although the SEC
declined to make specific recommendations on Regulation S-K, it received several
comments with suggestions.230 In a letter to the SEC, Ernst & Young laid out a
number of recommendations “for simplifying and modernizing Regulation S-K.”231
The letter cites Ernst & Young’s own research on the burden that disclosures under
Regulation S-K places on issuers.232 Analyzing annual disclosures from 1972
through 2011, Ernst & Young found that the average number of pages of footnotes
had increased by 1,625 percent.233 The average pages of Management Disclosure &
Analysis had increased by 1,500 percent and were predicted to fill more than 500
pages of disclosure in 2032 if the rate continued.234 According to Ernst & Young, the
problem stems from the fact that “standard setters rarely eliminate existing
requirements when they add new ones.”235
To alleviate this heavy burden, Ernst & Young suggested that the SEC
eliminate or revise certain types of disclosures:




Disclosures created to address a void in GAAP requirements in the past that may
now be redundant with note disclosures that were mandated later
Disclosures of information investors can more easily obtain from sources other
than SEC filings
Disclosures that have become industry-specific rather than applicable to all
entities

226. See Peter Chapman, Ticking Up: Larger Tick Size Considered For Small-Cap Companies, TRADERS
MAG.
(Aug.
2012),
http://www.tradersmagazine.com/issues/25_341/jobs-act-tick-spread-110179-1.html
(discussing liquidity issues in small cap stocks as they relate to a potential increase in tick size).
227. Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Professor, Georgetown Univ. McDonough Sch. of Bus., to U.S Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n 1 (June 19, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-i/tick-size-study/tick-sizestudy-1.pdf.
228. Id.
229. REGULATION S-K REPORT, supra note 217, at 93.
230. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobs-act.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
231. Letter from Ernst & Young LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2-5
(Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-i/reviewreg-sk/reviewreg-sk-3.pdf
[hereinafter Ernst & Young LLP Letter].
232. See id.; ERNST & YOUNG, NOW IS THE TIME TO ADDRESS DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD (2012), available at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ToThePoint_BB2367_DisclosureOverload_21June2012/$FILE/Tothe
Point_BB2367_DisclosureOverload_21June2012.pdf.
233. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 232, at 2.
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Vol. 3, Fall 2014

86

Emerging Growth Companies under the Jobs Act


Disclosures based on purely quantitative thresholds without regard for
materiality236

In addition to these eliminations and revisions, Ernst & Young recommended that
the SEC “revisit the way disclosure information is filed and presented to
investors.”237 For example, under the recommended changes, certain basic
disclosures (such as the issuer’s directors and executive officers, business risks, and
address) “would only need to be updated when something changes.”238 Until the
SEC makes its own conclusions regarding Regulation S-K, however, it is unclear
whether Ernst & Young’s recommendations will align with those of regulators.
VI. Conclusion
The JOBS Act has been a controversial but exciting piece of legislation in an
economy stricken with a multitude of interrelated symptoms, unemployment being
one of the most pressing. Despite unusually high bipartisan support for the law,
some critics argue that the link between IPOs and job creation is too attenuated to
justify removing long-standing investor protection laws. Others question whether
deregulation in any amount will resolve the issue of too few IPOs.
Since its enactment, the JOBS Act may have introduced more questions than
it has solved. The ability to confidentially file disclosure documents might be
enticing companies to think more about going public. But the continued lack of IPOs
in 2012 seems to indicate that companies who test the market with confidential
filing are not changing their minds about going public, but are rather confirming
that they want to remain private. Yet very small companies, e.g., those with less
than $250 million in annual revenues, appear to be increasingly attracted to the
public markets. The markets are still awaiting SEC conclusions on the effects and
future of decimalization and Regulation S-K, but it appears that more needs to be
done to make the IPO process more efficient. Over the next few years, and hopefully
coupled with a growing U.S. economy, emerging growth companies will demonstrate
to the markets whether they believe Title I of the JOBS Act has been successful.
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